Investment Sharing 1

Never depend on single income. Make investment to create a second source.-Warren Buffet

Investment Sharing 2

An investment in knowledge pays the best interest.-Benjamin Franklin

Investment Sharing 3

Anyone who is not investing now is missing a tremendous opportunity.-Carlos Sim

Investment Sharing 4

In short run, the market is a voting machine, but in long run it is a weighing machine.-Benjamin Graham

Investment Sharing 5

Dont look for needle in the haystack. Just buy the haystack.-Jack Bogle

Friday 22 March 2013

Warren Buffett on "The Key of Investing"

Warren Buffett had this to say in a 1999 Fortune article that was written as the tech bubble was coming to an end:

"The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage. The products or services that have wide, sustainable moats around them are the ones that deliver rewards to investors."

In the article, Buffett also points out that many of the most"glamorous" businesses -- many that have changed the world dramatically for the better -- did not ultimately reward their investors.

One often has little to do with the other.

At the time, he was saying that stocks, due to excessive valuations and the high expectations of investors, were likely to disappoint (of course, he supposedly didn't get the "new paradigm"). Yet, Buffett was still optimistic that the businesses themselves would keep increasing in value and that, over time, investors would be "considerably wealthier, simply because the American business establishment that they own will have been chugging along, increasing its profits..."

The intrinsic worth of American business has been increasing since that article was written. Businesses just needed a good chunk of the past decade plus for the per-share value to catch up to the then prevailing premium market prices.

At the time that article was written, Buffett made it clear he wasn't predicting what stock prices might do in the near-term or even longer. Those who have read and listened to him over the years knows Buffett has never really been interested in that sort of thing.

Instead, he was thinking in terms of how price compared to valuation, and likely longer term outcomes, not trying to predict price action. Eventually, value is what counts, but individual marketable securities, and markets more generally, are capable of moving in ways that have little to do with value for very long periods of time.

The intrinsic worth of American business might be increasing over time, but stock prices may not necessarily reflect that until much later.

So while valuations may be less nonsensical these days, it still reveals nothing about what stocks might do over the next several years. Attempting to judge where market prices stand in relation to per-share value is time well spent. Guessing what the price action might be over the next month or even several years is not.

Buffett added this in the most recent Berkshire Hathaway (BRKashareholder letter:

"American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don't forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.)

Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it's a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of 'experts,' or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it."

It's understandable, even if not particularly enriching, that investors and other market participants weigh the risk of loss versus the possibility of gains asymmetrically.

Loss aversion is a very powerful thing.*

Having said that, those who think they can "dance in and out"effectively (and many certainly seem to try!) might want to carefully consider the last line in the above excerpt from the letter.

Friday 1 March 2013

Benjamin Graham: Timing vs Pricing Stocks

"By timing we mean the endeavor to anticipate the action of the stock market—to buy or hold when the future course is deemed to be upward, to sell or refrain from buying when the course is downward. By pricing we mean the endeavor to buy stocks when they are quoted below their fair value and to sell them when they rise above such value. A less ambitious form of pricing is the simple effort to make sure that when you buy you do not pay too much for your stocks. This may suffice for the defensive investor, whose emphasis is on long-pull holding; but as such it represents an essential minimum of attention to market levels.

We are convinced that the intelligent investor can derive satisfactory results from pricing of either type. We are equally sure that if he places his emphasis on timing, in the sense of forecasting, he will end up as a speculator and with a speculator's* financial results." - Benjamin Graham

Back in 2009, Warren Buffett said the following:

"We don't try to pick bottoms. To sit around and not do something sensible because you think there might be something better…. doesn't make sense. Picking bottoms is not our game. Pricing is our game. And that's not so difficult. Picking bottoms is, I think, impossible." - Warren Buffett

Buffett: Picking bottoms is impossible

Market participants attempting to get the timing right (something that seems more close to futile than not) end up distracted from what's important: Making price versus valuation judgments that, over the long haul, will get the best possible result at the least risk.

Attempts at timing is inherently speculative and a distraction away from the all-important price versus value discipline.

Mispriced assets often seem to get sorted out in nearly, if not completely, unpredictable ways in terms of timing. It's important to be realistic -- when the timing does happen to work out -- about the real reasons why. Successful moves don't always get the scrutiny they deserve.

Sometimes the favorable outcome was more about luck than great foresight.

Sometimes it has little to do with having some unusual talent for predicting the amount and timing of price movements.

Not knowing when a favorable outcome was mostly accidental is a recipe for future mistakes.

An approach dependent on lucky or accidental outcomes is destined to result in even bigger losses down the road if it leads to unwarranted overconfidence. A few successful outcomes resulting more from good fortune, less on real foresight, might encourage that market participant to put even larger amounts of capital at risk (with maybe less favorable outcomes). I'm not saying no one can effectively time these things (even though my interest in such an approach is effectively zero). I'm saying those that try had better have a realistic view of their own abilities.

Overestimation of one's own talent in this regard will likely end up being very expensive.

The good news is a long-term investor doesn't have to get the timing right if sound price versus value judgments are mostly being made. Mistakes are inevitable, of course. The key is keeping them small and infrequent. One way to keep them small and infrequent is to always pay an appropriate discount to a well-judged valuation. An appropriate margin of safety is protection against small misjudgments (since valuation even done well is inherently imprecise) and the unforeseen adverse developments that inevitably arise in an unpredictable world.

Developing competence when it comes to understanding how price relates to the value of an asset is a good use of energy.

Attempts at timing the market generally isn't.

Expect wild fluctuations in price and allow that inevitable dynamic -- Mr. Market's inherent moodiness and -- to serve.